I. INTRODUCTION
The Presidential election of 2000 raised a number of unprecedented legal and political issues. Among those were the issues raised by the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 (the "Act"), a heretofore obscure statute that took on massive importance in both the political framework of the election as well as the practical framework of George W. Bush's efforts to effectuate a smooth presidential transition.
1 Like so many other issues raised by the election fall-out, the issues raised by the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 presented legal issues of first impression and crucial political questions. Fought against the backdrop of the contentious presidential election and the legal and public relations battles that swirled around it, the issues of the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 took on profound importance. Unlike other issues raised by the election which are likely to prove unique to the 2000 election, the issues surrounding the law of presidential transitions are likely to arise again in the future, especially because the way in which the Act was implemented raises substantial concerns of future mischief.
The facts surrounding the 2000 presidential election are well-known. On the night of the general election, the Republican ticket of George W. Bush and Richard Cheney claimed victory in the presidential election on the basis of a narrow victory in Florida. When combined with the other states claimed by Bush and Cheney, Florida's electoral votes gave them 271 votes, one more than necessary to claim the White House. Democratic rivals Al Gore and Joe Lieberman refused to concede the election and instead contested the Bush victory in Florida, initiated litigation and requested recounts of various ballots in Florida. As a result of the narrowness of the Bush lead and the complexity of the litigation and recount issues, the election's final outcome remained in the balance for several weeks. The election was not finally settled until early December, when the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Bush in the case of Bush v. Gore. 2 The next day Gore conceded the election to Bush.
In most presidential elections, the outcome of the election is known the day after the general election. The President-elect has only seventy-three days from the election date in November and the President's inauguration on January 20 of the following year to appoint senior policy analysts, prepare a budget for presentation to Congress, and begin making legislative priorities. 3 Given the massive scope of the transition responsibilities and the relatively short time frame to conduct those activities, every day during the transition period is crucial. In fact, it usually takes several months into the President's term to complete the "transition" and to fill all of the necessary personnel appointments.
Before 1963, presidential transitions primarily were staffed by volunteers and funded by the political party of the incoming President. 4 In order to ease the difficulties of conducting a presidential transition, Congress enacted the Act. The Act provides a variety of resources for office space, staff compensation, communications services, and printing and postage costs associated to be made available for the Presidential transition (collectively, the "transition resources" or "transition funds"). 5 The General Services Administration ("GSA") is the federal agency assigned to administering the funds and office space allocated for the presidential transition. For Fiscal Year 2001 the General Services Administration was authorized a total of $7.1 million for the upcoming transition: $1.83 for the outgoing Clinton Administration; and a total of approximately $5.3 million for the incoming administration, including $1 million appropriated under the 2000 amendments contained in the Presidential Transition Act of 2000. The Administrator of the General Services Administration (the "Administrator") is the individual responsible for dispersing the money appropriated for the transition as well as executing the responsibilities of fitting the office for operation. The Administrator of the GSA is appointed by the President.
The Administrator refused to release the funds to any incoming administration on the ground that he was unable to ascertain an "apparent successful candidate" in the election. In fact, the Administrator took no action to release the funds or the office space until after Al Gore conceded the election on December 13. Throughout this period, the Administrator refused to articulate any specific standard that he would use to make the determination. During this period he offered at least three different and mutually contradictory interpretations of the Act to justify his inaction. Initially he indicated that he would release the transition resources as soon as a candidate was certified as having received a majority of electoral votes in the election, stating that he would release the transition funds and the keys to the transition office "to whichever candidate garnered the necessary 270 electoral votes after Florida's outcome was certified." 8 In the face of the Florida recount imbroglio and under political pressure from the White House, he quickly amended his position. Although he refused to articulate any express standard, he later suggested he would consider two other criteria as especially important. These two criteria were: (1) a concession by one of the candidates, 9 and/or (2) a resolution of all election contests and all election-related litigation. 10 At the same time he apparently repudiated his earlier position that the certification of an electoral college winner was even a relevant criterion. He provided no explanation as to why he considered those two factors to be especially relevant or why the certification of an electoral college winner would not be relevant. Nor did he ever declare whether these two criteria were disjunctive or conjunctive, or whether one was more important than the other. In fact, the Administrator vacillated throughout the entire post-election period, referring to the need for a concession at some times, the need for a resolution to election contests at other times, and a need for both a concession and a resolution to election contests at still other times. To the extent that a resolution of election controversies was required, he never stated whether this necessitated a final resolution or whether he was empowered to use his judgment to declare the contests effectively concluded. Keys] (announcing that the offices were ready and that he was ready to turn over the keys to the president-elect). 9 Archibald, Bush Won't Get Keys, supra note 8. 10 On November 27, the GSA released a statement that the election results were still not clear, despite the Florida vote certification. See George Archibald, House Leaders Seek Reasons for Denial of Transition Funds, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2000, at A1. The statement read, "Today, both sides are continuing with their stated plans to seek legal remedies with respect to this election so the outcome remains unclear and unapparent." Id. See also Esther Schrader, Transition Agency All Dressed Up, Nowhere to Go, PITTSBURGH POST -GAZETTE, Nov. 10, 2000, at A10, available at 2000 WL 27783932 (quoting GSA Deputy Administrator Thurman Davis, "We'll make the call on handing over the offices whenever the determination is made on who is going to be president. If we get lawsuits, we cannot know who the winner is. We won't know. We 13 (quoting GSA spokeswoman Beth Newburger, "As long as both sides are still going to court, and both sides say they are, we believe that the outcome remains unclear."). 11 As will be shown infra this distinction is crucial, as the Administrator's refusal to recognize Bush as the President-elect on the facts of the 2000 election appears to have been based on a fundamental Finally, in the waning days of the controversy he adopted a third position, that he was actually forbidden by the Act from releasing the transition resources in a "close" election while the final results remained in doubt. 12 He made no attempt to square this position with his previous positions. 13 To the extent that any consistency could be gleaned from these multiple twists and turns, it appears that the Administrator believed that he had the sole discretion to interpret the terms of the Act and the conditions under which the Act's release of funds was triggered, and that he could make the factual determinations required by the Act according to his plenary and unreviewable subjective assessment of the facts of the situation.
Finally, on December 12, the Supreme Court put an end to all further election-related litigation in Florida in Bush v. Gore. Still, the Administrator refused to act, stating that he awaited a concession speech by Vice-President Al Gore.
14 Following Gore's concession in a nationally-televised speech, on December 13 the Administrator finally released the transition funds and turned over the keys to the transition offices to George W. Bush and Dick Cheney. 15 Even at this point the Administrator still never articulated why he waited for an express concession rather than simply acting after the Supreme Court's ruling that resolved the relevant litigation. This substantially delayed Bush's transition, including the initiation of the appointments process and background checks on potential appointees. 16 The effect of this delay placed a heavy burden on the Bush-Cheney transition team. On one hand, they could have deferred their transition efforts indefinitely, until the Administrator decided to release the funds. On the other hand, they could rely solely on private funding for their transition, a result that the framers of the Act specifically sought to avoid. 17 In the end, they chose the latter option, although they erected substantial safeguards to prevent conflicts of interest and the appearance of impropriety. 18 Either way, the Administrator's denial of the transition resources heavily prejudiced the Bush transition efforts, cutting the official transition period in half and forcing Bush to rely for several weeks on purely private funds to effect his transition.
misunderstanding of the law governing presidential elections. See discussion infra at notes ___-___ and accompanying text. 12 See House Legislators Debate Allocation of Transition Funds, CONGRESS DAILY, Dec. 4, 2000, available at 2000 WL 27012859 (statement of GSA that "Congress made it perfectly clear that if there is 'any question' of who the winner is 'in a close contest,'" then the GSA was not permitted to declare a winner). 13 This essay argues that under the facts of the 2000 presidential election, the Administrator had no statutory authority to withhold the transition resources and that, as a result, the prejudice imposed upon the Bush transition effort was wholly unjustified. 19 This essay will explore the language, intent, and policy goals of the Act, concluding that under the facts of the 2000 presidential election, the Administrator was required to release the transition resources once Bush received a majority of pledged and certified electoral college votes. Although the Act vests the Administrator with some discretion, this discretion is limited to making a narrow finding of fact and is heavily circumscribed by the history and language of the Act. The discretion accorded by the Act is far narrower than that seized by the Administrator in the 2000 election. Moreover, this essay will show that the basis claimed by the Administrator to justify his interpretation of the statute rested on a fundamental misunderstanding of the statute and the legislative history. The Administrator acted lawlessly and irresponsibly throughout the entire dispute, prejudicing the Bush-Cheney transition and harming the country as a result.
The essay addresses the various arguments advanced by the Administrator to justify his refusal to release the transition resources to Bush prior to Al Gore's concession on December 13. Part II reviews the Administrator's initial justification that the language of the Act is ambiguous and his implicit assertion of authority to render an authoritative legal interpretation of the Act that provided him with discretion to refuse to release the transition resources to Bush. A close reading of the Act's language shows it to be unambiguous in its terms, at least on the facts of the 2000 election. This Part of the essay will further show that even if the Act is thought to be ambiguous, the Administrator acted improperly in his interpretation of the Act. Part III reviews the legislative history and the political context of the Act. The legislative history reinforces the plain language reading of the Act, and the historical context of the Act also provides important context for understanding the debates over the Act. Part IV reviews the specific legislative history relied on by the Administrator to deny the release of the transition resources to Bush, and shows that the Administrator's understanding of this legislation history was flawed. Part V reviews the policies of the Act and demonstrates that requiring the Administrator to release the funds as soon as Bush received a majority of pledged and certified electoral votes was more consistent with the policies of the Act than allowing the Administrator untrammeled discretion to withhold the funds until he is subjectively satisfied that the apparent winner could be recognized. Part VI of the essay briefly discusses proposals for reforming the Act to prevent another debacle like that of the 2000 election. Part VII concludes.
II. THE SCOPE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR'S DISCRETION
The Administrator's initial position was that the language of the Act was ambiguous, and that he was therefore empowered to exercise discretion in construing the Act's terms. Although the Administrator never formally articulated a justification for his authority, his position presumably was rooted in the logic of the so-called "Chevron doctrine." 20 Assuming that this doctrine was the basis for his claimed authority, this Part of the essay shows that the Administrator's acts were not protected by Chevron; nor is it even clear that Chevron would even apply to this case. Under Chevron, if a statute is unambiguous, then it is to be applied according to its terms and no discretion is owed to the agency asserting authority. This essay shows that the Act is unambiguous, at least in relevant part and as it relates to this case. But even if the statutory language is ambiguous, the Administrator's interpretation should be reviewed under the less-deferential standard of review of Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 21 rather than Chevron. Under the Skidmore standard, the Administrator's decisions were entitled to very little deference at all. Finally, even if Chevron does apply to this situation, the Administrator's refusal to release the transition resources once Bush received a majority of pledged and certified electoral college votes represented an unreasonable interpretation of the statute and was thus not protected by any discretion that he may have otherwise been allowed to exercise.
Under Chevron, a court must apply a two-step process to determine the determination of whether a court should defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute. 22 Under the first step of the Chevron analysis, a court must determine whether Congress intended to delegate lawmaking authority to the administrative agency claiming the power to regulate. Resolving this first prong will require the court to resolve two additional intertwined issues. Initially, the court must determine whether the language of the statute unambiguously resolves the question; if so, then Congress can be understood to have already exercised its law-making authority. If the statute is ambiguous, the court must determine whether Congress intended for the agency to fill the ambiguity by delegating law-making authority to that agency, or whether Congress intended for the gap to be filled by judicial interpretation, looking to agency interpretations for persuasive (not binding) guidance as to the meaning of the statute.
Under the second step of Chevron, if there is ambiguity in the statute and it is evident that Congress intended for the agency to issue an authoritative interpretation of the statute, then the court should defer to any reasonable, authoritative interpretation of the statute's command. However, the second prong in the Chevron analysis is relevant only if the statutory language is found to be ambiguous or that Congress intended to delegate authority to the administrative agent to engage in law-making activity. This Part will apply the Chevron analysis to determine whether the Administrator acted appropriately in refusing to release the transition funds to Bush-Cheney once it secured a majority of pledged and certified electoral votes. As will be shown, under the plain language of the Act, the Administrator was required as a matter of law to release the transition resources once Bush received a majority of certified electoral college votes. Furthermore, even if it is believed that the Administrator was not compelled as a matter of law, on the facts of the 2000 election there was no reasonable basis for the Administrator to refuse to release the transition resources to Bush. Even if it is believed that the Act is ambiguous and that therefore the Administrator held some discretion, the discretion intended for the Administrator to exercise is limited to making a narrow factual finding, not sweeping legal interpretations. Finally, it will be 21 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) . 22 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. shown that given the legal and factual determinations made here, along with the absence of formal procedures to guide his decision-making, the Administrator's actions should be governed under the less-deferential Skidmore standard, rather than Chevron.
A. Plain Language
Section 3 of the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 authorizes the Administrator, upon request, to provide to the President and Vice-President-elect "necessary services and facilities" to effectuate the transition of the President-elect to become President. 23 The debate centered on the statutory definition provided in subsection (c) of the Act, which provides:
The terms "President-elect" and "Vice-President elect" as used in this Act shall mean such persons as are the apparent successful candidates for the Administrator following the general elections held to determine the electors of President and Vice President in accordance with title 3, United States Code, sections 1 and 2. 24 The crucial question to be resolved in implementing the Act, therefore, is when does a candidate qualify as the "apparent winner" of the election, so as to be designated as the "President-elect" under the statute.
Legal Significance of a Certified Electoral College Majority
The Act does not define the phrase "apparent successful candidates," but the plain language of the statute and standard principles of statutory construction provide some evidence of the statute's meaning. For instance, the use of the term "apparent" is defined as "appearing (but not necessarily) real or true," 25 thereby distinguishing between the "apparent" and "real" winners of the election. The use of the term apparent successful candidate makes it evident that the recipient of the funds need not be the officially designated, actually successful candidate, and since its enactment the Act has never been construed to require that the apparent successful candidate prove that he is the actual successful candidate.
In fact, the Act contemplates and permits payment of obligations incurred as early as the day after the general election if an apparent successful candidate can be identified. 26 The actual successful candidate, of course, could not be identified until the final counting of the electoral college ballots in January. Clearly then, the statutory language indicates that the use of the term "apparent" means something distinct from the "actual" or official winning candidate.
The Administrator presumably believed that the relevant terms in the Act were ambiguous, giving him discretion to refuse to declare Bush the apparent winner. But read in 23 Presidential Transition Act, § 3. 24 context, the term is not sufficiently ambiguous to support the Administrator's proffered reading of the statute. In the interpretation of a statute, a reviewing "court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."
27 If Congress has expressed its intent unambiguously, "the inquiry is at an end" and the agency interpretation must yield to the statute.
28
Statutory language must not be read in isolation, but in the overall context of the statute. As the Supreme Court recently observed in FDA v. Brown & Williamson, "A court must therefore interpret the statute 'as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme' and 'fit, if possible, all parts into a harmonious whole.'" 29 Thus, it is not enough to simply ask whether any ambiguity in the statute exists. Rather, the proper inquiry is whether the statutory language, read in context and assuming a reasonable connection between the language and purposes of the statue, produces an unambiguous result.
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The relevant question in this situation is whether under the plain language of the statute the GSA Administrator was required to name Bush "President-elect" under the Act once he secured a majority of certified electors in the election. Following the certification of the Florida popular vote on November 26, 2000 by the Florida Secretary of State in favor of BushCheney, the Governor of Florida executed and forwarded to the National Archives the Certificate of Ascertainment designating the Bush-Cheney slate of electors as Florida's electors. 31 When combined with the Certified and pledged electors of other states, this guaranteed Bush-Cheney 271 electoral votes, a number sufficient to have them elected President and Vice-President respectively.
By using the term "apparent" Congress recognized the possibility that some contingency might intervene causing a situation where the "apparent winning candidate" did not, in fact, turn out to be the actual winning candidate. This could be for any number of reasons, including the death of the President-elect during the transition period, 32 35 or a "faithless" elector who violates his pledge and votes for a candidate different from the one for whom he promised to vote. 36 The drafters of the Act specifically considered the possibility of faithless electors and the fact that faithless electors could upset the final recognition of the apparent winner as the actual winner. Acknowledging that this was a possibility in every presidential election, the drafters of the Act nonetheless agreed that this possibility would not provide a basis for refusing to recognize the pledged electors in ascertaining an apparent winner. 37 Any of these contingencies could occur in any Presidential election, and, in fact, have actually occurred in prior elections. However, there is no reason to believe that the possibility that they may arise again should interfere with making the designation of an apparent successful candidate when one can be identified.
The plain language of the Act also clearly limits the Administrator's discretion in naming the President-elect. Thus, the plain language of the Act forecloses the Administrator from naming Ralph Nader of the Green Party or Harry Browne of the Libertarian Party as the "apparent successful candidate." Although one could imagine scenarios where one of these candidates ended up winning an electoral college majority when the balloting actually occurred, the Administrator clearly could not name either of them as the apparent successful candidate. The reason is clear-even though either could conceivably win the election, neither not hold an electoral college majority following the popular election.
Thus, although the Act may hold some ambiguities in ascertaining the apparent winner, it is not so radically indeterminate so as to support any reading offered by the Administrator. The Administrator did not have discretion to name Ralph Nader the apparent winning candidate; nor did he have discretion to refuse to name George W. Bush the President-elect once Bush received a majority of certified electoral votes. At that point, Bush became the apparent winner, notwithstanding the fact that factors could intervene that might later prevent him from being the actual winner of the election. A candidate could fall ill on the night of the election, raising doubts about whether the candidate might survive until the electoral college met to formally elect him President. Nonetheless, it would be senseless to argue that this happenstance excused the Administrator from naming that candidate the President-elect under the statute. Whatever the ambiguity that may exist in the Act, the Act clearly compels the Administrator to name an apparent winner when one candidate has secured an electoral college majority.
Despite the plain language of the statute, the Administrator refused to release the transition resources until "the results [were] clear," and maintained that the results would not be clear until all contests relating to the Florida election were resolved. As the foregoing discussion . 35 See discussion infra notes 110-125 (describing Hawaii during 1960 election). 36 There have been 7 faithless electors in the last century, in 1948, 1956, 1960, 1968, 1972, 1976, and 1988 has indicated, this is a mistaken interpretation of the Act. This interpretation confuses the statutory requirement that there be an "apparent" winning candidate with a non-statutory concern that the apparent winner may not, in fact, turn out to be the "official" winner when the remaining issues are resolved. The Act requires only that the Administrator be sufficiently satisfied that one of the candidates is the apparent winning candidate, not that he is certain to be the actual winning candidate. As noted, contingencies are always possible such that there is no way to guarantee that the apparent winner will turn out to be the actual winner. Once Governor George W. Bush received a sufficient number of electoral votes no question remained that he was, in fact, the apparent winning candidate for purposes of the statute, even though he may have eventually turned out to be the losing candidate, and not the actual winning candidate in the election.
Identification of an "Apparent Winner" on the Facts of the 2000 Election
Because Bush held a certified electoral college majority, the Administrator's refusal to Act must have been based on his belief that the ascertainment of the "apparent winner" required a probabilistic evaluation of the likelihood that the apparent winner would turn out to be the actual winner in the end. Taking these factors together, there was no plausible way for Gore to win the election once Florida's electoral votes were certified for Bush on November 26. More fundamentally, the results of the Florida litigation were largely irrelevant to the eventual outcome of the election. At best, Gore could have precipitated a floor fight between two competing slates of electors, a fight that he almost certainly would have lost. Thus, there was no reasonable basis for the Administrator to believe that the outcome of the election depended on the outcome of the litigation. Evidently he simply misunderstood the law of presidential elections. 45 Thus, even had the Administrator believed that he possessed the power to conduct an assessment of the probable end-result of the election, there remained little doubt as a legal matter that Bush in fact would eventually prevail as the winner of the election. Bush could have lost in only the most unlikely of circumstances. First, Gore would have had to win the litigation--which he actually lost in the United States Supreme Court). Second, he would have had to win the ballot recount--which independent media recounts after the election concluded was highly uncertain. Third, he would have had to convince the state of Florida to file a second Certificate of Ascertainment in light of a successful recount. Finally, he would have had to win the floor contest in Congress over the recognition of the Gore slate rather than the Bush slate, which would have required either a Bush concession or a change of heart by the Republicancontrolled Florida state legislature. All four of these were necessary conditions for Gore to prevail in the election; had any of them failed then Gore could not win the election. Moreover, on few of these issues did Gore have a greater than infinitesimal chance of prevailing, much less prevailing on all four counts. 47 In short, just as the Act prohibits the Administrator from considering such long-shot possibilities as that of a faithless elector, he was equally unjustified in considering the long-shot possibility that Gore might actually win the election here.
B. The Scope of the Administrator's Discretion
Even if the language of the statute is ambiguous in this context, the Administrator still lacked authority to interpret the Act as he did. The Act requires the Administrator to release the transition resources as soon as the apparent successful candidate can be identified. The Act vests some discretion in the Administrator to determine whether a candidate qualifies as the apparent successful candidate. But the scope of the Administrator's discretion under the Act is narrowly circumscribed. Moreover, the scope of the Administrator's limited discretion does not protect the Administrator's decision to refuse the release of the transition resources to a candidate who holds a certified majority of electoral college votes.
Under Chevron
Even if the statute is ambiguous, it must still be determined that Congress intended to delegate law-making authority to the administrative agency. Although Chevron is primarily a constitutional doctrine relating to the separation of powers between the branches of the federal government, 48 the Supreme Court has also noted that it is usually supported by the policy rationale that agencies usually have greater expertise as to the subject regulated than does Congress or the courts. 49 Although it is not necessary for such an agency to have particular expertise in the subject matter delegated to it, in determining whether Congress intended a delegation it is relevant to inquire whether the agency has expertise in the subject matter. 50 It is certainly possible that Congress might intend to delegate authority to an agency to issue regulatory decisions in an area where it has no particular expertise. Nonetheless, one would expect that if Congress intended such an unusual action, it would make its delegation exceedingly clear. 51 In a situation where the agency that has purportedly received the delegation lacks any expertise with respect to the issue in question, one would expect Congress to be very explicit about why it was making such a delegation. The Act provides no evidence that Congress intended to delegate broad decision-making authority to the Administrator; in fact, all logic and evidence points in the opposite direction. The Administrator of the GSA would be a curious choice to make the determination as to the who was the President-elect of the United States for purposes of the Act. The responsibilities of the GSA are to handle the purchasing of office supplies for the government and to print government publications.
52 GSA Administrator David Barram was an executive at Apple Computer and Hewlett-Packard before President Clinton appointed him to run the GSA. 53 There is little in Barram's background prior to entering government or his experience as Administrator of the GSA to suggest that he would be appropriately qualified to make the important legal and factual determinations required by the Act. Indeed, his terrible misunderstanding of the law governing presidential elections illustrates his lack of expertise and unsuitability for the delegation supposedly made by the Act. Given the GSA's function and the Administrator's expertise, it is far more plausible to believe that Congress might defer to the Administrator the discretion to choose between the ordering of #1 lead versus #2 lead pencils than it is to believe that Congress intended for the Administrator to determine the "President-elect" of the United States.
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The Administrator's obvious lack of expertise suggests that Congress did not intend to make a general delegation of law-making power to the GSA administrator. Under the terms and structure of the Act, the Administrator serves as a largely ministerial officer for purposes of executing the terms of the Act. The discretion afforded to the Administrator is to make the factual determination of whether a candidate is the apparent winner of the election. narrow factual finding provides no basis for the Administrator to freelance with respect to rewriting the legal standard or for an arbitrary assessment of the factors that he subjectively believes to be important. The Act implies a bright-line legal standard that should be applied according to objectively determinable facts that the Administrator may consider in reaching his conclusion. Moreover, it provides a test that can be implemented by reference to objective facts and provides a basis for ensuring that the Administrator's conclusion be reasonably justified by reference to those facts. It provides no basis for the Administrator's belief that it allows him to indulge his subjective assessments as to the legal standard to apply or the facts to consider. Once the Administrator makes the factual determination of one of the candidates as the apparent winner, he is instructed to release the transition funds to that candidate upon request. The Administrator has narrow discretion to make the factual determination of "who is the apparent winner in order to perform the ministerial functions under this act." 56 His discretion under the statute is limited to this narrow factual finding; there is no evidence that Congress intended a more general delegation to the Administrator. Thus, if Chevron governs the interpretation of the Act, then there is still no reason to believe that the Administrator was acting within the scope of delegated power.
Under Skidmore
Given the lack of expertise of the GSA in making the determination in question here and the slapdash procedures used to make the decision, it is thus doubtful that Congress intended to make a Chevron-style delegation of authority to the Administrator in this case to render an authoritative legal interpretation of the Act. Instead, the Administrator's actions should be reviewed under the less-deferential Skidmore standard of review, 57 which was recently reiterated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Mead Corporation. 58 There the Court held that Chevron deference is owed only "when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated i n the exercise of that authority." 59 Otherwise, Skidmore controls.
In discerning congressional intent to delegate law-making authority under Chevron, a court will examine, among other factors, the rule-making processes used by the agency to articulate its regulation. The case for deference is stronger where the final decision is reached by some sort of formal and deliberative process reached after compliance with the notice-andcomment rules of the APA. 60 Because Chevron essentially grants the executive power to engage in interstitial rulemaking within the ambiguities of the statute, 61 such as notice and comment and due process. As the Court stated in Mead, "[i]t is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force." 62 Where such formalities are absent, by contrast, Skidmore applies. The Supreme Court has been more troubled when the policy is articulated through opinions derived through processes other than notice-and-comment and formal rule-making, although it has upheld decisions made through this process. 63 Here, even such a watered-down form of due process was absent. Congress, it is suggested, would not be likely to delegate law-making authority to an agency that could then exercise that powerful authority without the safeguards of notice-and-hearing and other protections. Where the Administrator makes a summary interpretation of the statute without any sort of formal rulemaking or regulatory procedures, as he did here, little deference i s owed. 64 The Skidmore doctrine applies in such situations rather than the Chevron doctrine, meaning that the agency pronouncement is treated as having only persuasive authority rather than binding authority. 65 Just as it is inappropriate to second-guess a l egitimate delegation of law-making power from Congress to an agency, it is equally inappropriate to create such a delegation where Congress intended no such delegation. 66 Here, the Administrator's interpretation of the Act is largely unpersuasive and would not be likely to be acceptable were it reviewed in court. Under Skidmore, therefore, deference to the Administrator is inappropriate. As Justice Jackson observed in Skidmore, "[t]he weight [given to an administrative] judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 62 Mead, 121 S. Ct. at 2172. 63 Id. In delineating the types of delegations of agency authority that trigger Chevron deference, it is therefore important to determine whether a plausible case can be made that Congress would want such a delegation to mean that agencies enjoy primary interpretational authority.").
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." 67 The nondeliberative, indeed bizarre, nature of the Administrator's decision-making process in this case, its lack of grounding in the statute's language and history, and the shoddiness of the Administrator's decision-making process all suggest that a court would give little weight to the Administrator's interpretation. 68 And because of its persuasive rather than constitutional grounding, the presence of agency expertise is even more important for Skidmore deference than for Chevron-an expertise that is manifestly absent in this case. 69 Indeed, Skidmore contemplates at least a modicum of deliberation, expertise, and due process, none of which was present in the Administrator's decision. It is difficult to believe that Congress intended to constitutionally delegate to the Administrator the authority to interpret a statute of high national importance without any articulated standard as well as the power to willy-nilly revise any standard that he did announce, yet provide no opportunity for the affected parties to contest the Administrator's decision. Nor is this a detailed regulatory scheme where the Administrator has any sort of expertise. 70 In such cases, not only is Chevron deference not owed, but even Skidmore deference should be rejected.
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C. The Administrator's Construction of the Statute Was Unreasonable
Even if the statute is ambiguous and it is believed that the Administrator was delegated the authority to interpret the Act, any such interpretation must still be reasonable to be binding. The recognition of the narrow scope of the Administrator's discretion to make a narrow factual finding of whether a candidate can be ascertained as having an electoral college majority is the only one consistent with the language, structure, and policies of the Act. The Act clearly contemplates that there will be minimal discretion vested in the Administrator to make the determination as to when one candidate has become the apparent winning candidate. Once that determination is made, the Act relegates the Administrator to a wholly ministerial role. Given the predominantly ministerial role envisioned for the Administrator under the statute, it is absurd to think that Congress vested broad discretion in the Administrator to make an unconstrained determination of when an apparent winning candidate has been i dentified. Rather, Congress clearly contemplated that the determination would be narrow and constrained by objective facts, most obviously whether any candidate has earned a sufficient number of electoral votes to become President. The Act's emphasis on speed and continuity further indicates that the transition was expected to begin as soon as an apparent winner was identified, even though further contingencies or developments might later render this judgment erroneous as to the actual 67 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) . 68 See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 586. 69 See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139 (noting that source of Skidmore deference is agency's "specialized experience and broader investigations and information" available to the agency). 70 cf. Mead, 121 S. Ct. at 2175 ("There is room at least to raise a Skidmore claim here, where the regulatory scheme is highly detailed, and Customs can bring the benefit of specialized experience to bear on the subtle questions in this case. . . ."). winner. 72 Allowing the Administrator to determine according to his own time-table when he is subjectively satisfied that a candidate has qualified as the President-elect threatens substantial delay of transition activities and essentially gives the Administrator the primary role in determining the success or failure of the new administration's transition and first year in office. It is simply not a logical or reasonable statutory scheme to believe that Congress intended to vest such powerful discretion and authority in a minor ministerial agent. Professor Jonathan Turley testified to Congress that empowering the Administrator of the GSA to make the determination as to the apparent winner is a "bizarre choice."
73 Although accurate, this critique misses the point. Providing this power to the GSA Administrator would be a bizarre choice if determining the actual winner required any substantial degree of judgment or expertise. But as the Act is written and as the authors of the Act understood, identifying the apparent winner requires little discretion or expertise. There is nothing in the statute to suggest that the Administrator has been delegated the unreviewable discretion to hold up the disbursement of the transition funds based on his subjective evaluation about the eventual outcome of the election when there is no substantial evidence to support this delay.
It is not a reasonable construction of the Act to interpret it in such a manner as to vest such broad, unreviewable discretion in the Administrator. It is generally assumed that Congress does not intend to draft illogical or irrational legislation. 74 Reading the Act so as to vest broad, unreviewable discretion in the Administrator would constitute exactly such an utter irrationality. It is implausible to believe that Congress meant for a ministerial officer such as the General Services Administrator to wield such potentially vast power. After all, the Administrator's duties are to handle the purchasing of office supplies and printing governmental publications. This is undoubtedly a vast and important responsibility, but there is little reason to believe that it qualifies the GSA Administrator to make a discretionary legal judgment as to the meaning of the term "President-elect" under the Act or to make an unfettered subjective assessment of the facts of the situation. One might expect with equal plausibility that Congress would vest the Secretary of HUD with the power to order military air strikes on Iraq. In both cases, the particular expertise of the government official claiming the power in question is simply inconsistent with the responsibility claimed under the statute. One could imagine Congress making such a peculiar delegation of power, but if so, one would expect that Congress would act unambiguously and 72 The policies of the Act are discussed in greater detail infra at Part V. 73 See Jonathon Turley, Transitioning to a New Administration: Can the Next President Be Ready?, Testimony Before a Hearing of the Subcommitte on Government Management, Information, and Technology (Dec. 4, 2000) available at http://www.house.gov/reform/gmit/hearings/2000hearings /001204.transition/001204jc.htm (calling the Administrator of the GSA a "bizarre choice to make any designation of an apparent winner in a presidential election"). 74 See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("When used in a proper manner, this narrow exception to our normal rule of statutory construction does not intrude upon the lawmaking powers of Congress, but rather demonstrates a respect for the coequal Legislative Branch, which we assume would not act in an absurd way."); United States v. DBB, Inc., 180 F.3d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999) ("We will only look beyond the plain language of the statute at extrinsic materials to determine the congressional intent if: (1) the statute's language is ambiguous; (2) applying it according to its plain meaning would lead to an absurd result; or (3) there is clear evidence of contrary legislative intent.").
explain why it chose such a strange course. Here, by contrast, Congress spoke ambiguously at best and in fact seems to have spoken strongly in the opposite direction. That such a construction of the statute is necessary to reach such an absurd results indicates that the construction is incorrect. It is the proffered construction of the statute, not the statute itself, that generates this irrational result. The statute certainly does not command this absurd result.
A far more sensible construction of the statute is that Congress intended for the Administrator to act as a ministerial officer under the statute with limited discretionary power. Indeed, if Congress had intended for the Administrator to wield so much discretion, it almost certainly would have taken steps to insure that the discretion was not exercised in an arbitrary or irrational way. For instance, Congress could have provided some mechanism for review of the Administrator's discretion, such as by appeal to a court, or it could have vested the discretion in a more senior governmental official with more relevant expertise, such as the Attorney General. Congress also could have vested the exercise of such discretion in an independent commission or some other body empowered to make the decision free of partisan political influences. Alternatively, Congress might have established specific factors for the Administrator to consider so as to channel his discretion, such as whether one candidate has conceded or whether recounts are still ongoing. Congress also presumably would have required the Administrator to create some written record of the factors he actually considered in exercising his discretion and an explanation for how he reached his conclusion.
In fact, Congress provided for none of these options. There are no procedural constraints on the exercise of the Administrator's discretion, such as appeals. There are no substantive constraints in the Act, such as an identification of the factors the Administrator should consider in reaching his decision. In the 2000 election, the Administrator vacillated among a number of different theories and explanations for his action, or more precisely, his inaction. Testifying before Congress almost a full month after election night he still expressly refused to articulate how and when he would reach his conclusion or what factors he would consider, stating "I don't want to predict how I will select an apparent winner." 75 It is inconceivable that Congress intended this ministerial officer to exercise unreviewable, unconstrained discretion of the sort he claimed during the 2000 election. If Congress had intended this it almost certainly would have placed some substantive and/or procedural limits on the Administrator's discretion. That Congress did not provide for some reasonable constraint on the Administrator's discretion-or any constraint for that matter-indicates that it did not intend to grant plenary, unreviewable discretion as claimed by the Administrator.
Given the absence of such constraints, it is far more plausible that Congress did not intend for him to possess such broad discretion. Congress plainly intended for the Administrator's discretion to be very narrow and limited to the predicate factual determination of the apparent successful candidate. Although in some cases it might be difficult to ascertain the apparent winner, where one candidate has a certified majority it is not. Instead, the Administrator claimed that the absence of guidance from Congress empowered him to exercise his unfettered, subjective judgment as to when he was sufficiently persuaded that an apparent winner could be identified. 76 This is an astounding claim. It is far more plausible that Congress did not provide guidance for his decision or review of his decision because it believed that the decision would be a mechanical decision controlled by objective facts, such as whether a candidate could claim a certified electoral majority. Congress's failure to expressly limit his discretion makes sense only in the context of its manifest intent to provide the Administrator with minimal discretion and that this decision should be reached through objective, easily-verifiable criteria.
The claim that the Act grants the Administrator plenary authority to make a subjective determination as to when he believes the apparent w inner is ascertainable raises further concerns. In the context of the 2000 election, there is strong evidence that the Administrator's decision was heavily influenced by political pressures emanating from the Clinton White House that instructed the Administrator-a political appointee-to refrain from declaring Bush the apparent winner. 77 The White House denied exerting such pressure. On November 9, the day after the election, the Administrator held a televised press conference to announce that the transition offices were ready for occupancy, and that he was ready to release the $5.3 million in presidential transition funds and the keys to the transition offices "to whichever candidate garnered the necessary 270 electoral votes after Florida's outcome was certified."
78 "But," GSA officials later admitted, "as the Florida muddle unfolded, the Clinton-Gore administration stepped in to halt the start of any transition." 79 Once Gore began legal challenges in Florida, "the White House stepped in to oversee and supervise Mr. Barram, a Clinton appointee."
80 Within days of the election, it was announced that "Barram alone will not make the decision," but would do so only after consulting with the White House. 81 Chief of Staff John Podesta promulgated a memorandum ordering transition planning to be put "on hold" and that no transition assistance should be given to either candidate until the Florida controversy was definitively resolved. 82 Podesta's directive was issued the day before Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris was to certify Florida's recounted returns. 83 It appears that the instructions to await the resolution of the Gore legal challenges in Florida emanated from the White House. 84 The Administrator's final position that he lacked the authority to release the funds in a "close" election also tracks the eventual position taken by the White House on the issue. 85 The White House denied that this congruence of opinion was the result of political pressure. 86 Given the nature and timing of the Administrator's vacillations, it is difficult to believe that the White House applied no political pressure on the Administrator.
Even if it is believed, somewhat incredibly, that the Administrator was not influenced by political pressures from the White House during the 2000 election, his belief that the Act allows him to exercise unfettered discretion and his refusal to articulate any legal standard or to specifically identify which facts will be relevant in making the determination raises the clear possibility that that the Administrator will be improperly influenced by political considerations in future elections. In a situation such as the 2000 election where the opposition party controls the White House, this raises the concern that the release of the transition resources will be held up so as to undermine the success of the new party's transition to power. The Act provides no mechanism to force the Administrator to act or to review his decision not to act.
Given the alternative possible constructions of the statute, the only one that makes sense is that Congress did not intend to vest broad discretion in the Administrator. Rather, Congress intended that he would be governed by bright-line rules, such as whether one of the candidates had a majority of pledged and certified electors. Moreover, as noted, this construction fits more closely with the plain language of the statute and its clear legislative intent. It is illogical to believe that Congress vested this anonymous ministerial officer with the unconstrained, unreviewable discretion to determine the "President-elect" for purposes of the Act's terms. Indeed, the Administrator's actions during the 2000 election demonstrate the unsuitability of allowing this minor official to exercise the crucial powers claimed under the Act. decision-making, he vacillated among several different standards, none of which seemed to have any grounding in the text, intent, or policies of the statute. He seized on legally-irrelevant factors, such as the lack of a concession, to justify his refusal to declare an apparent winner, while simultaneously ignoring the primary, if not exclusive, factor that the Act instructed him to consider: whether a certified Electoral College majority could be identified. When he finally made up his mind, it was based on an ex post and ad hoc judgment that he was finally persuaded that he could ascertain an apparent winner according to his unstated legal and factual standards. When not relying upon the rationale of a lack of a concession, he pointed to the one factor that Congress was most obvious in excluding, namely the continuation of legal proceedings and ballot recounts that might eventually overturn the designation of an apparent winner.
If Congress had intended to vest this discretion in the Administrator, it almost certainly would have required that the Administrator articulate the legal and factual standards he would apply and would have provided some mechanisms for guiding and reviewing his discretion. Instead, the Administrator claimed the power to make up the legal and factual standard as his subjective assessment of the situation changed. The absurdity of the Administrator's construction of the statute and the bizarre belief that his erratic actions were consistent with the statute's mandates indicate the unreasonableness of his interpretation. Given the choice between an absurd construction of the statute and one that fits with the language, intent, and policies of the statute, it is presumed that Congress meant to enact the statute in a way that actually makes sense.
III. HISTORICAL AND LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT OF THE ACT
The Administrator also argued that the legislative history of the Act supported his interpretation that he was not required to release the transition funds to Bush despite his having gained a majority of certified electoral votes. Indeed, in the waning days of the election controversy he argued that he was forbidden from releasing the transition resources to Bush while the election remained a "close" election. He based his claim on some snippets of legislative history drawn from the floor debates on the Act. In reviewing this legislative history, however, the Administrator pulled the statements in question out of their proper legislative and historical context. When read in context, it is evident that the Administrator is mistaken about the significance of the legislative history on which he relied. Because of the Administrator's heavy reliance on legislative history, this Part will explore the general historical and legislative context of the Act, showing that when read in its totality the legislative history supports the interpretation of the Act that has been advanced in this essay. A review of the legislative history will also reveal that the factors on which the Administrator actually relied, namely the need f or a concession by one of the candidates or an end to all litigation in the case, are plainly excluded by the legislative and historical context of the Act. Part IV of this essay then examines in greater detail the specific excerpts from the legislative history relied upon by the Administrator. It will be shown that the slivers of legislative history relied on by the Administrator were taken out of context. Once they are understood in their historical and legislative contexts, it will be seen that they fail to support the interpretation advanced by the Administrator.
A. Legislative History
The crucial distinction between the apparent and actual successful candidate is evident in the legislative discussion surrounding the enactment of the Act. The legislative history of the Act is quite summary, and little of it deals with the issues raised by the 2000 election. 87 Nonetheless, there is some legislative history available in the form of floor statements during debates over the Act. Floor exchanges are a disfavored form of legislative history, but they are valuable in amplifying the plain language of the statute, especially where, as here, there is no helpful committee report. 88 One floor exchange during the debate is especially illuminating, and so it is reproduced here at length:
Mr. HALEY. I wish the gentleman in charge of handling the bill at this time would give to the members of the committee a little explanation of when under the terms of this bill a person becomes the President or Vice-President-elect.
I notice that these funds can be used immediately after the general election in November. But how would this situation work, for instance, if the President or, at least, before the determination of the votes in the electoral college, suppose that some person was, say, three or four votes shy? How would this Administrator determine who was in a position to expend these funds?
The reason I ask this is because in my humble opinion a person does not become the President or President-elect until after the Congress has had an opportunity to examine the ballots cast in the electoral college. Only at that point when that determination has been made by the House of Representatives does a man become the President-elect.
Mr. FASCELL. I would say to my distinguished colleague . . . that the gentleman is absolutely right in a technical sense with respect to the determination of the election of the President and the Vice President. . . .
[The relevant statutory language was then quoted] This act and the Administrator could in no way, in any way, affect the election of the successful candidate. The only decision the Administrator can make is who the successful candidate -apparent successful candidate -for the purposes of this particular act in order to make the services provided by this act available to them. And, if there is any doubt in his mind and if he cannot or does not designate the apparently successful candidate, then the act is inoperative. He cannot do anything. There will be no services provided and no money expended.
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This colloquy amplifies the plain language of the Act -that the relevant determination to be made by the Administrator is solely to determine whether one candidate is the "apparent" successful candidate, not whether that candidate is guaranteed to be t he actual successful candidate after the Congress counts the ballots in the electoral college. It is also evident that the inquiry is intended to be made in light of whether a candidate has a majority of certified and pledged electoral votes. If a candidate lacked sufficient electoral votes-such as being "three or four votes shy" of an electoral college majority-then no apparent winner could be recognized until the election was actually resolved in the electoral college or House of Representatives.
But this hypothetical situation was not the case in the 2000 election. In that election, after Florida certified its electoral results Bush in fact had a sufficient number of pledged and certified electoral votes to be elected President. Thus, even though one could imagine situations where it might be difficult or impossible for the Administrator to identify the apparent successful candidate, this case is not one of them. Absent an adequate number of electoral votes there is no apparent successful candidate; but where one candidate has a sufficient number of electoral votes to be elected President, then that individual is the apparent winning candidate. Neither case is difficult.
B. Historical Context: The 1960 Election
Congress believed that the inquiry to determine the apparent winner of the election generally would be routine and would be amenable to resolution by objective facts of the type presented in the 2000 election. Congressman Haley and Congressman Fascell recognized that some cases may arise where the Administrator will be unable to designate an apparently successful candidate, although Congressman Fascell deemed this "an unlikely proposition." I do not see any great big problem in the Administrator of the General Services Administration being unduly involved in the matter of determining who is the apparent winner in order to perform the ministerial functions under this act. . . . The gentleman previously pointed out in the last election [the 1960 Presidential election] we had one that was as close as we would want to have an election and nobody had any trouble in deciding who was the apparent winner.
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Understanding how the Act would have applied to the facts of the 1960 election helps to illuminate the distinction drawn between the actual and apparent winners of the election. In turn, understanding this history indicates how the authors of the Act intended the Act to apply in a situation like the 2000 election. The 1960 election was an extremely close and highly contested election, almost identical to the 2000 election. In fact, the final winner of the 1960 election could not be predicted confidently for several weeks after the election date. Nonetheless, Fascell observes that despite the closeness of the election and the questions raised about who might prevail as the actual winner, it was not difficult to determine that Kennedy was the apparent winner. Given that the Act was enacted against the backdrop of the Nixon- 90 Id. 91 Id. at 13348 (emphasis added).
Kennedy election, it is important to understand the facts of that election. Understanding how the Act would have applied to those facts helps to illuminate the distinction the Act draws between the "apparent" winner and the actual winner. In turn, that history will help to explain how the Act should have been applied to the 2000 presidential election.
General history of the 1960 election
Legend has long held that there were credible allegations that John F. Kennedy "stole" the 1960 presidential election through massive voter fraud in several states and that despite the belief that Kennedy had stolen the election, Nixon refused to challenge Kennedy's victory and stepped aside "for the good of the country." This legend is false. Indeed, it was not for some time after the election that one could confidently say that Kennedy would actually win the electoral college. The final outcomes in several states remained in doubt for quite some time pending the final resolution of recounts and Republican-initiated litigation. 92 Litigation and recounts proceeded apace in several states and the final results of the election were not established for several weeks after the election. Nonetheless, this did not detract from the fact that Kennedy could have been determined to be the apparent winner.
California, then as now a large and important state, was originally credited to Kennedy but was reversed almost two weeks, and its 32 electoral votes were later awarded to Nixon after absentee ballots were counted. 93 in eight of those states, looking for evidence of fraud and election irregularity that could be used to reverse the results in those states. 99 Another aide encouraged the creation of a Nixon Recount Committee in Chicago. 100 Reporter Earl Mazo of the New York Herald Tribune reported on a series of fraud-related issues that were picked-up by other reporters and served to fuel the recount and litigation fires.
Recounts actually proceeded in several states. In New Jersey, the Republican Party secured court orders for recounts in five counties and did not cease the recount effort until December 1.
101 Kennedy was certified the state's winner by 22,091 votes. In Texas, the Republican Party sued to overturn the results, securing a federal court injunction to delay certification of the vote until its petition for a recount of 1.25 million ballots could be heard. However, the federal district judge later dismissed the injunction and the suit for lack of jurisdiction.
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Illinois was even more hotly contested. Morton flew to Chicago to confer with Illinois Republican leaders on recount strategy, "while party Treasurer Meade Alcorn announced Nixon would win the state."
103 "The Cook County Republican chairman alleged that 100,000 fraudulent votes had swung Illinois to Kennedy through a systematic looting of votes in twelve [Chicago] wards and parts of two others."
104 One precinct, virtually deserted because of highway demolition activity, reported seventy-nine votes for Kennedy and three for Nixon, even though there were less than fifty registered voters in the precinct on election day.
105 Kennedy won the state by 9,000 votes, but carried Cook County by an astonishing margin of 450,000 votes. 106 The Illinois recount of 863 precincts was not completed until December 9, during which Nixon gained 943 votes. Still losing after the recount, the Illinois Republicans unsuccessfully petitioned the State Board of Elections for relief. The national party did not cease its efforts in Illinois until December 19, when the Electoral College voted Kennedy as the new president.
107 Following the election, three people were sent to jail for election-related crimes in Cook County and 677 others were indicted before being acquitted by Judge John M. Karns, "a Daley crony." 108 Had Nixon succeeded in reversing Kennedy's Illinois victory, he would have still been four votes shy of an electoral college majority. 109 At that point, however, it was thought that southern electors might bolt the Kennedy ticket and withhold votes from the Kennedy-Johnson ticket, thus throwing the election into the House of Representatives. This scenario was made more plausible by the so-called southern unpledged elector movement, discussed below. 99 Id. 100 
Hawaii
In Hawaii, the results were even more dramatic and were not resolved until long after the election. Given the factual similarities between Hawaii in 1960 and Florida in 2000, the facts of Hawaii's situation bears further review. 110 Following the election, Hawaii originally certified Nixon the winner of the state by a mere 141 votes (92,505 for Nixon and 92,364 for Kennedy).
111 Democratic Party leaders immediately decided to contest the results. As was later reported, "National results were close enough and Republican recount demands elsewhere strong enough that they considered it possible Hawaii's three votes might even decide the election."
112 The Democrats alleged a number of flaws in the election that they believed would overturn the 141 vote margin. They filed suit in Hawaii Circuit Court, charging voting irregularities in 198 of Hawaii's 240 precincts. 113 This included an allegation that although some ballots for Kennedy were counted, the poll officials failed to record them on the tally sheet.
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The Democrats also alleged that some ballots were counted for Nixon despite defects in the marking of the ballots by the voters. 115 They also argued that there were 235 more votes counted in the presidential contest than were actually cast, and that 1,283 ballots were entirely unaccounted for in the total tabulation.
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The presiding Judge in the case, Circuit Judge Ronald B. Jamieson, ordered a recount in thirty-seven of Hawaii's precincts, or a total of 32,273 votes. 117 However, it was impossible to complete the recount in time to meet the deadline of December 19, when the presidential 110 Hawaii's situation in 1960 is also important in that it provides the primary congressional precedent for congressional procedures for resolving disputes over two 118 Finding the recount going against them, on December 23 a Democratic Party "specimen" or sample ballot was found in the ballot bag with all of the proper ballots. The Republicans argued that this evidenced Democratic efforts to commit election fraud, and the Republicans demanded that the entire state presidential election be declared void. 119 The FBI, the U.S. Attorney's Office, and the State Attorney General's office launched an investigation of the incident to determine whether fraud occurred as a result of the sample ballot. 120 Nonetheless, the recount continued and Kennedy slowly ate into Nixon's lead. Finally, on December 30 the recount was completed and the court ruled that Kennedy had carried Hawaii by 115 votes. 121 On January 4, 1961 the new Governor of Hawaii transmitted a second Certificate of Ascertainment on behalf of the state, reporting that as a result of the lawsuit and recounts, Hawaii's electoral votes were to be recorded for Kennedy rather than Nixon.
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Congress convened on January 6, 1961 to count the Electoral votes. Ironically, Nixon, as Vice-President, was the presiding officer over the vote counting process. 123 When it came time to report Hawaii's votes, Nixon asked for unanimous consent that the Kennedy electors be counted. 124 In so doing, Nixon averted a confrontation on the floor of the House. Hawaii's Democratic Senator Oren E. Long and its Democratic Representative Daniel K. Inouye were prepared to object to the count if the Nixon certificate were counted rather than the Kennedy certificate. 
Southern unpledged elector movement
Further complicating the 1960 presidential election, as well as the context for interpreting the debates over the Act in 1963, was the so-called "unpledged elector movement" The subsequent election of conservative Dwight Eisenhower to the White House in 1952 temporarily quelled the southern political movement, but the nomination of Northeastern Catholic Kennedy in 1960 triggered concern in the Democratic Party in the South.
128 Rather than running their own candidate, as they had done in 1948, in 1960 the southern states formed the so-called southern unpledged elector movement. 129 The cornerstone of the movement was the fact that the Constitution places no specific limits on the candidate for whom an elector may vote; unless state law otherwise instructs, an elector remains free to vote his conscience. Most states have long required electors to vote for the candidate for whom they are pledged, and award their electoral votes to the candidate who receives the largest number of electoral votes in their state. Even if electors are not formally constrained by state law, however, they almost invariably vote for the candidate for whom they are pledged, except for the rare circumstance of a faithless elector.
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During the 1960 election, however, electors in Mississippi and Alabama specifically sought election as unpledged electors, thereby retaining the right to vote their preferences, rather than pledging themselves to a specific candidate. In Alabama the ballots listed only the names of the individual electors for the various parties, and made no mention of the actual presidential candidates, Kennedy and Nixon. 131 There had been stiff competition in Alabama to determine who would be placed on the ballot as Democratic electors-those pledged to support the party's national nominee or unpledged electors opposed to the national policies of the party. A primary and runoff in the spring had resulted in selection of six unpledged and five 126 On December 10, 1960, Alabaman's six unpledged electors met and announced that they would cast their votes "for an outstanding Southern Democrat who sympathizes with our peculiar problems in the South."
133 They also announced, "our position remains fluid so that we can cooperate with other unpledged electors for the preservation of racial and national integrity," and lashed out at those Southern Democrats who continued to support Kennedy. 134 On December 12 the Alabama unpledged electors met with Mississippi's unpledged electors and agreed to throw their unpledged elector support to Senator Byrd of Virginia. They also drafted a joint statement calling on presidential electors from other states to bolt to Byrd, in the hope that enough electoral votes might be withheld from Kennedy to deprive him an electoral college majority and thereby throw the dispute into the House of Representatives. Once the election was in the House, the southerners hoped that all southern delegations would vote for Byrd and Republicans would join them in order to ensure Kennedy's defeat. 135 In the end, the Alabama and Mississippi unpledged electors failed to peel-off any other Democrats from the Kennedy ticket. The only additional Byrd vote they picked-up was from one Henry D. Irwin, a faithless Nixon elector from Oklahoma. In the days after the election, Irwin had telegraphed all Republican electors with a plan. Noting that there were insufficient Republican electoral votes to deny Kennedy the election, Irwin suggested that the Republicans abandon Nixon and join forces with southern Democratic electors to elect Byrd as President with Barry Goldwater as Vice President. 136 Irwin received many replies, several of them favorable, but they stated that they had a moral obligation to vote for Nixon. Irwin subsequently asked the Republican national committee members and state chairman to free Republican electors from their obligations to vote for Nixon, but he had little success.
Although the southern unpledged electors failed to tip the balance in the 1960 election, their impact was significant. Moreover, as will be explained below, this long-forgotten incident cast a long shadow over both the debates and drafting of the Presidential Transition Act in 1963.
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C. Implications of Legislative and Political History
Testifying before Congress on December 4, 2000, David Barram, the Administrator of the GSA, described the 2000 election as an "unprecedented, incredibly close, and intensely 132 Id.at 69. 133 Id. 134 Id. 135 The new House party lineup had 23 states controlled by northern and border state Democrats, 17 controlled by Republicans, and six controlled by Deep South Democrats. Four delegations were evenly split between the parties. Id. at 69. As noted above, the Republicans held out their own hopes that the Southern Democrats would throw their support to Nixon. 136 Id.at 70. In the electoral college, Irwin voted Byrd for President and Goldwater for Vice President. The southern unpledged electors voted for Strom Thurmond as Vice President. 137 See discussion infra at Part IV. contested election, with legal action being pursued by both sides." 138 The historical context described above belies this statement. The 1960 election-the election conducted immediately prior to the Act's passage-was extraordinarily close and litigation and recounts continued for weeks after the election. California and Hawaii both switched columns for the candidates, and Hawaii's recount was not completed until January 4, 1961. Investigations of vote fraud in several large states persevered into mid-December, threatening to overturn the results in those states. The combination of unpledged and faithless electors that eventually generated fifteen electoral votes for Harry Byrd threatened to upset Kennedy's electoral college majority and actually undid his popular majority.
Despite all of this uncertainty about who might eventually be the actual winner of the 1960 election, Congressman Fascell stated (without objection) to the House that there was no problem ascertaining the "apparent winner." 139 The only scenario that fits with this historical context is that the drafters of the Act recognized the possibility that in some elections the apparent winner conceivably could turn out not to be the actual winner. Thus, even though Kennedy had some of important state victories overturned (in California), and Nixon actually lost a state that was certified to him (Hawaii), and still others states remained in doubt for weeks after the election, this does not change the fact that Kennedy was easily ascertainable as the apparent winner long before there could be any confidence that he was going to be the actual winner of the election. A standard rooted in a bureaucrat's subjective intuition of the various possible scenarios that may have developed is not consistent with this history. The only coherent understanding must be that Kennedy was able to claim a certified Electoral College majority notwithstanding the independent electors. Despite the real threat that the Electoral College majority might later be overturned, that did not make it difficult to ascertain Kennedy as the apparent winner.
This turbulent history casts substantial doubt specifically on the position taken by the Administrator in the 2000 presidential election. Recall that he originally articulated two factual explanations for his purported inability to recognize George W. Bush as the President-elect for purposes of the Act. 140 First, he argued that he could not recognize an apparent winner until all of the outstanding litigation associated with the election was completed. Second, he stated that he would not recognize a President-elect until either Bush or Gore conceded the election. Both of these rationales are inconsistent with what actually occurred in the 1960 election that shaped the views of the Act's drafters on this point. Whatever factors the Administrator relied upon in making his decision, it is clear that the two that he articulated were uniquely poor choices in that they had been squarely considered and rejected by the authors of the Act.
Resolution of Uncertainty
First, given the historical backdrop of the 1960 election, it is absurd to believe that when the drafters wrote the Act in 1963 that they intended that it would prevent the 138 See Barram, supra note 13. 139 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 140 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. The Administrator later announced a third factor, which will be discussed in Part IV, infra.
Administrator from ascertaining an apparent winner until all litigation and recounts were complete. As just described, litigation and recounts continued following the 1960 election throughout December and even into January 1961 before all of the electoral votes were finally settled. Pivotal states such as New Jersey, Illinois, and Texas were still deciding election-related litigation up to and beyond the time when the Electors were to meet to cast their ballots. Had Illinois's election results been reversed, then there would have been great uncertainty about the eventual result of the election, especially when combined with the unpredictability spawned by the Hawaii recount and the southern unpledged elector movement. Given this context, it is simply implausible that the drafters of the Act believed that an apparent winner could not be ascertained while litigation and election contests were still being conducted. If so, it certainly would not have been as easy to determine the apparent winner as Fascell stated that it was.
The Administrator's argument that he could not ascertain a winner until all litigation was complete is troubling in that it allows the losing candidate or losing party to extend the period of election uncertainty indefinitely simply by filing lawsuits and recount requests throughout the country. Indeed, just by bringing legal action or seeking a recount in California, Texas, and New York, a candidate could place almost any election into doubt. Simply by keeping litigation ongoing, a "sore loser" candidate or party could dramatically undermine the transition efforts of the winning candidate by indefinitely postponing the declaration of a President-elect under the Act. Third-party and fringe candidates would seemingly have drastic ability to disrupt the recognition of a President-elect in a timely manner. There is no reason to believe that Congress intended for this to occur. Indeed, it is evident that Congress meant for the transition to begin as soon as possible after the election. The Act's emphasis on speed and bright-line rules for ascertaining the apparent winner indicates that Congress did not intend for this declaration to be held hostage to a possible sore loser candidate seeking to delay the victor's transition. It is unlikely that the drafters of the Act intended a result so counter-productive to the Act's policies. Alternatively, the Administrator will be required to estimate the likely results of all the ongoing litigation in order to determine the degree to which it raises the possibility of overturning the election results. 141 This too is an improbable interpretation. There is simply no reason to believe that Congress intended for the GSA Administrator to be in this position, nor is there any reason to believe that the GSA Administrator will have the competence or expertise to make such an evaluation. As noted, David Barram was an executive for Apple Computer and Hewlett-Packard before taking over at GSA. There is little in his background to suggest that he was qualified to make the determination required by the Act. Moreover, the ascertainment of the apparent winner is a largely ministerial function, not a free-ranging inquiry into the likelihood of one candidate or the other prevailing on the merits of various litigation being conducted throughout the country at any one time. Thus, it is even less plausible to believe that Congress meant for the President-elect's transition to be held hostage by the subjective assessments of the 141 See Turley, supra note 73 ("Congress was aware that controversies could clearly continue until six days before the voting of the electoral college. Congress was further aware that challenges to the results could occur in any state. It chose not to wait for the period for controversies to be concluded in authorizing the release of transition funds and support. Yet, under Mr. Barram's interpretation, the Administrator must make a personal judgment as to the merits of litigation that could affect any critical state.").
GSA Administrator as to the merits of the various lawsuits that might be pending for months after the election.
Indeed, as discussed above, had Barram conducted an inquiry about the likelihood that the litigation might overturn the result of the election, he would have soon recognized that this was unlikely. Barram's belief that the results of the litigation might actually affect the results of the election demonstrates more his unsuitability for exercising the discretion he claimed to possess than it demonstrates the propriety of withholding a decision until the final resolution of litigation. As noted above, Gore had no conceivable possibility of prevailing as the winning candidate in the election once the state of Florida initially certified its electoral votes to Bush. Thus, had the Administrator actually made an informed and reasoned evaluation of the situation, it would have been obvious that Bush would have been the prevailing candidate in the end. Given the virtual impossibility of a Gore victory in the election, the Administrator was simply mistaken in believing that the outcome of the Florida litigation could have actually affected the outcome of the election. Thus, even if the Administrator was waiting for a resolution of all relevant uncertainty regarding the outcome of the election, he still should have recognized Bush as the apparent winner once Florida's electoral votes were certified for him. The probability that Gore might actually win the election was thus comparable to the other scenarios described above that might intervene between the election and the electoral college vote, such as recounts or faithless electors who upset an election. Indeed, one is tempted to observe that it is precisely to avoid errors like this that administrative discretion is usually provided only to officers who actually have expertise in the subject area relevant to the delegation. This is also why it is to be assumed that in general Congress would have desired to insulate ministerial officers such as the Administrator of the GSA from the political pressures that surely influenced his decision-making in this situation.
Need for a concession
It is true that Nixon, unlike Gore, conceded early on in the 1960 election, but there is no reason to believe that the Act's authors thought that this difference would constitute a legallyrelevant distinction under the Act. There is nothing in either the legislative history of the Act or the Act itself to imply that the lack of a concession would be relevant in any way to the triggering of the Act. Obviously, if one candidate did concede an election, this would be relevant to determining an apparent winner. But the absence of a concession cannot be a valid basis for refusing to act. The failure to concede an election is simply too prone to manipulation and strategic behavior to be a reliable factor on which to rely in administering the Act.
Nor is it a plausible interpretation to believe that one candidate must concede before an apparent winner can be ascertained. Using this standard would be even more troubling than the "end of litigation" standard as far as carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under this standard, a losing candidate could simply refuse to concede the election until the Electoral College met. During that period it would be impossible to declare an apparent winner. Congress certainly could not have intended such an irrational application of the Act.
A concession has no legally binding effect in an election, nor should it have any legal effect for application of the Act. Assume, for instance, that after Nixon conceded the 1960 election Republican operatives succeeded in overturning enough electoral votes to win the election for him. 142 In fact it is argued that Nixon purposely conceded on one hand but implicitly endorsed the contest efforts on the other, simply so that he could attempt to overturn the election results without being perceived as a sore loser if he was u nsuccessful, thereby preserving his future political viability.
143 Did the concession mean that Nixon could not be the President-elect (or President, for that matter), or that Nixon's concession had the constitutional consequence of making Kennedy President? Of course not. What if the election were thrown into the House of Representatives? Would Nixon have been ineligible to be named Presidentelect? What if Nixon conceded, but Byrd did not? The election results exist in an objective reality independent of whether a candidate subjectively concedes the election under the Act; the status of President-elect similarly exists in a reality independent of a candidate's concession. But again, the reality as to who is the actual winner is different from the Act's inquiry as to which candidate is the apparent winner.
Similarly, assume that Al Gore had carried through with his election-night plan to concede, only to learn the next day that he might win (or might have won) the Presidency. The concession would have had no legal effect whatsoever. For instance, there was important litigation being conducted in Florida where, for political reasons, Al Gore was not a party, just as Nixon was not a party to the 1960 election litigation. This litigation was being conducted solely in the name of Florida voters and the Florida Democratic Party-just as the efforts on behalf of Nixon were conducted in the name of the RNC and various state actors. 144 However, it is obvious that Gore, like Nixon in 1960, knew of the litigation, did nothing to deter it, and would have accepted the results had they benefited him. In short, the notion of waiting for a candidate to concede the election is not only inconsistent with the purposes of the Act, but it proposes a standard that simply makes no sense within the context of the Act.
In fact, Gore did concede to Bush late on election night, only to retract it that same night. What if he had waited a week before retracting it? What if he conceded privately to Bush but not publicly? What if he intended to concede, but was incapacitated for some reason and unable to do so? What if he had conceded both to Bush and publicly, only to retract it? Would Bush have been the President-elect under the Act for that week, only to lose the designation when Gore recanted? Indeed, was Bush eligible for the transition resources during the brief period between Gore's early-morning concession and subsequent retraction? Although these questions may seem fanciful, they point up the absurdity of relying on a concession by one of the candidates to identify an apparent winner. Surely Congress did not intend that the statute's designation of the President-elect would be controlled by the losing candidate's decision of whether and when to concede the election. Waiting for a concession is simply too imprecise and too subjective of a standard to be consistent with the statute. Congress must have meant for some more objective criteria to guide the determination.
Thus, the available legislative history reinforces the plain language of the statute in concluding that the designation of Florida's electors by the Florida Governor made Bush the "apparent winning candidate" of the election by giving him 271 certified and pledged electors. At that time it was certainly possible to imagine numerous scenarios that might result in Bush not being the actual winning candidate, just as there were contingencies that may have resulted in Nixon overtaking Kennedy in the 1960 election. For instance, some electors could conceivably turn out to be faithless electors, breaking their pledges to vote for Bush and thereby throwing the election into Congress or giving a majority of electoral votes to Al Gore. Ballot recounts or post-election litigation might result in Bush losing electoral votes that were previously pledged or certified to him, as Nixon did with Hawaii in 1960. Recounts or absentee ballots could throw states back into play that were thought to be resolved. Nonetheless, these contingencies did not change the fact that Bush was the apparent winning candidate when he secured a majority of pledged and certified electoral votes, even though he may not have eventually turned out to be the actual winning candidate of the election. Similarly, it is possible that Kennedy's 1960 victory may have been overturned in the face of allegations of vote fraud in Illinois and elsewhere. Nonetheless, Kennedy was the apparent successful candidate the day after the 1960 election and George W. Bush was the apparent successful candidate from the time Florida certified its electoral votes in his favor.
IV. THE ADMINISTRATOR'S RELIANCE ON THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In the closing weeks of the election controversy, the Administrator adopted a third position. He argued that he actually had no discretion to release the transition funds, and that in fact, the legislative history of the Act instructed him not to release the transition funds in a "close" election, which he interpreted as applying to the 2000 election. He believed that while the litigation and recounts in Florida w ere still pending, he had discretion to withhold the transition resources. He rested his case on a few isolated clips of legislative history. As this Part of the essay indicates, his reliance on this legislative history is misplaced. When placed in their larger historical and legislative context, it is evident that the Administrator misinterpreted the meaning of these legislative snippets. In fact, once they are placed in their proper context, it is apparent that their true meaning is consistent with the argument advanced in this essay.
Testifying before Congress in early December, Administrator David Barram stated:
The Presidential Transition Act of 1963 makes it my responsibility to "ascertain" the "apparent successful candidates" for President and Vice President before the funds, services and facilities authorized by the Act become available to the Transition Team. While the Act gives no explicit criteria or deadlines for making this ascertainment, as the legislative history demonstrates, Congress made it perfectly clear that if there is "any question" of who the winner is "in a close contest" this determination should not be made.
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He rested his interpretation of Congressional intent on three excerpts from the floor debates on the bill. Here is his argument in full:
As Representative Fascell explained during the 1963 discussion of the bill, "in a close contest, the Administrator simply would not make the decision." 109 CONG. REC. 12238 (July 25, 1963) . Representative Fascell went on to explain that " [t] here is nothing in the act that requires the Administrator to make a decision which in his own judgment he could not make. If he could not determine the apparent successful candidate, he would not authorize the expenditure of funds to anyone; and he should not," id, "[i]n the whole history of the United States there have only been three close such situations. It is an unlikely proposition, but if it were to happen, if the Administrator had any question in his mind, he simply would not make any designation in order to make the services available as provided by the Act. If as an intelligent human being and he has a doubt, he would not act until a decision has been made in the electoral college or in the Congress." Id. at 13349.
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The Administrator's reliance on these shards of legislative history was misplaced. He failed to take account of the specific legislative and historical context in which the statements were uttered, and thus simply misinterprets their significance. Each of these statements must be considered in turn.
A. The Problem of "Close" Electoral Contests
The first two statements by Congressman Fascell both occur in a discrete colloquy with Congressman H.R. Gross and will be treated together. Gross asked Fascell, "We apparently have a situation growing up in certain States of the Union whereby there may be independent electors. Does not the gentleman think that those designated as President and Vice President by the present Administrator of General Services would be given psychological and other advantages by designating them as President and Vice President?" 147 To this query Fascell provided the reply quoted by the Administrator in his testimony, "I do not think so, because if they were unable at that time to determine the successful candidates, this act would not be operative. Therefore, in a close contest, the Administrator simply would not make the decision."
It is clear in this context that Fascell was not referring to the type of "close contest" that prevailed in the 2000 election. Instead, he referred to the type of close contest that suggested by the 1960 election, where the presence of southern unpledged electors might raise questions about whether a candidate actually held a certified electoral college majority, even if his party appeared to hold an electoral college majority. 148 It is clear that Fascell and Gross were not 145 Barram, supra note 13. 146 Id., at n. talking about the possibility that subsequent litigation, recounts, or other post-election activity might have the result of undoing an electoral college majority in a "close" election. Rather, they emphasized protecting the prerogatives of unpledged electors to exercise their independent judgment.
Representative Gross then criticized the Act for failing to make an explicit exception for this particular situation, as he believed that the Act compels the Administrator to designate an apparent winner notwithstanding the fact that many electors might actually be unpledged electors. Gross observed that the Act makes no exception for a situation where unpledged electors hold the potentially deciding votes in an election, and that the Act says "that the Administrator shall do thus and so. . . . It says he shall make the determination, does it not?" 149 Gross was concerned that the Act provided a mandatory requirement that the Administrator designate a President-elect, and in so doing infringed on the rights of independent electors. To this criticism Fascell provided the second comment relied upon by the Administrator: "There is nothing in the act that requires the Administrator to make a decision which in his own judgment he could not make. If he could not determine the apparent successful candidate, he would not authorize the expenditure of funds to anyone; and he should not."
150 Read in context, this colloquy clearly indicates if a candidate cannot be confidently said to have an electoral college majority because some of his party's electors are actually unpledged electors, then the Administrator should not designate an apparent successful candidate.
Gross then complained that even if the designation of a President-elect is not compelled in such a situation, the Act vests discretion in the Administrator to anoint a President-elect, even if so doing would be premature under the facts because of the presence of unpledged electors. Moreover, Gross was concerned that the Administrator would intentionally use this power in an improper manner to recognize a President-elect and thereby undermine the independence of the unpledged electors. In response to Fascell's admonition that the statute does not compel the Administrator to ascertain an apparent winner under these circumstances, Gross objected, "Well, it could be whoever he thought was the apparent winner; is that not correct?" To which Fascell responded, "It could be-yes." In response Gross further objected, "Yes. Of course, that is all the authority he needs-whoever he thinks is the apparent winner-that is allwithout waiting for the college of electors to meet and case the official ballots as provided for in the Constitution." In response to this interrogation by Gross, Fascell objected: I do not see any great big problem in the Administrator of the General Services Administration being unduly involved in the matter of determining who is the apparent winner in order to perform the ministerial functions under this act. . . . The gentleman previously pointed out in the last election [1960] we had one that was as close as we would want to have an election and nobody had any trouble in deciding who was the apparent winner.
The import of this exchange may need some elaboration, as it again relies on an understanding of historical context. Gross was a leading Taft-Goldwater Republican in the 1950s and 1960s. It is likely that he sought to protect the prerogative of unpledged electors both on principle as well as political advantage. 151 He did not appear to be concerned that an Administrator would misuse the power in a close election to designate either the Democratic or Republican candidate. What he was more likely concerned about was intra-party debate, primarily the intra-Democratic Party debate over the status of unpledged electors. To be more concrete, he was probably concerned about the upcoming 1964 election, where it was conceivable that a growing number of southern states would elect unpledged electors rather than Kennedy electors. Kennedy was not assassinated until the Fall of 1963, but the debates over the Act took place in July of 1963, thus Kennedy was expected to be the Democratic nominee for reelection in 1964 when these congressional debates took place.
152 At the time the Act was being debated, conservative Barry Goldwater had already been identified as a possible Republican nominee to challenge Kennedy. 153 At the same time, the southern states were embroiled in ongoing controversy with Kennedy over his civil rights polices. 154 Kennedy was thus quite vulnerable in the South and it would have been reasonable for Republicans to believe that Goldwater might be successful in claiming any unpledged southern electors. 155 As a purely political matter, therefore, conservative Republicans such as Gross would be expected to be quite adamant about protecting the prerogatives of unpledged southern electors. Moreover, if the unpledged elector movement in fact expanded across the South, it was foreseeable that the general e lection might produce a majority of Democratic electors, but not necessarily a majority of Kennedy electors. In such a situation, Gross was concerned that the GSA Administrator--a political appointee of the incumbent Kennedy administration, of course--would be permitted to recognize the unpledged Democratic Party electors as Kennedy electors and thereby designate Kennedy the apparent winner even though he would lack an electoral college majority. Had the Act been in place in 1960, for instance, the GSA Administrator could have tried to count the unpledged Democratic electors for Kennedy and declared him the President-elect. This is the likely explanation for Gross's repeated concern that the Act allows the GSA Administrator to designate "whoever he thinks is the apparent winner" as the apparent winner. The concern here was not with the factual difficulty of ascertaining the apparent winner in a close election, as the GSA Administrator claimed during the 2000 election. 151 The emphasis here is on political considerations, but this should not be read to denigrate the role of principle in Congressman Gross's thinking. Contemporaries recognized Gross as a sincere believer in federalism and strict construction of the Constitution; thus, he would have been inclined to support the constitutional prerogatives of electoral college voters to vote their consciences. 152 In fact, Gross implies that he believes that the real purpose of the Act was to benefit Kennedy. The issue was that despite the absence of a certified electoral college majority for Kennedy, the Administrator would allow political considerations to intervene and thereby interpret unpledged electors Kennedy electors.
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Gross also obviously feared that the Administrator would have the power to make a wholly subjective recognition of an apparent winner in the election, such as by counting unpledged Democratic electors to be Kennedy electors. It was feared that this would create psychological pressure on the unpledged electors to tow the Democratic party line and follow the Administrator's lead, thereby rendering their electoral college vote a fait accompli and sacrificing their independence. This would also limit their ability to throw their votes to Goldwater or to a Southern Democrat who could deny Kennedy an electoral college majority. Given his concerns, Gross would presumably have been equally appalled at the subjective nature of the decisions made by the Administrator in the 2000 election in refusing to recognize Bush's certified electoral college majority.
This colloquy also undermines a related argument made by the Clinton administration during the 2000 election. White House spokesman Jake Siewert referred to this legislative history at a press conference, claiming that that it indicated that the Administrator was not permitted to designate an apparent winner in a "close election" because doing so would create a psychological edge for one candidate or the other "in a contested election."
157 Siewart implied that this would provide a p sychological edge in public opinion. This is not a correct interpretation of the legislative statement on which Siewert relies. There is no reference in the floor debates to giving a psychological edge in a "contested" election. Read in context, the floor debates refer to the application of psychological pressure on unpledged electors. Again, the entire debate over the designation of an apparent winner under the Act returns to central, verifiable question of whether one candidate has achieved an Electoral College majority and the difficulty of determining this when some electors may be nominally Democratic but actually unpledged electors. Thus, neither of the first two excerpts relied upon by the Administrator support his belief that he is not empowered to make a designation in a "close election."
B. "Three Such Close Elections"
Consider the Administrator's final source of purported authority for the discretion to refuse to ascertain an apparent winner in a "close" election such as the 2000 election. In response to a question by Congressman Haley, Fascell observed that there had only been three such close elections, and that:
In the whole history of the United States there have only been three close such situations. It is an unlikely proposition, but if it were to happen, if the Administrator had 156 In fact, Gross seems to have had particular concerns about Kennedy himself using his power as the incumbent President to use the GSA designation in exactly this way. 109 CONG. REC. 13,348. any question in his mind, he simply would not make any designation in order to make the services available as provided by the Act. If as an intelligent human being and he has a doubt, he would not act until a decision has been made in the electoral college or in the Congress.
An examination of the "three such close elections" referenced by Fascell indicates that he clearly understood a "close election" to be one in which it was impossible to ascertain a certified electoral college winner. Although he did not identify the three elections to which he refers, he probably meant the elections of 1800, 1824, and 1876. 158 These elections were fundamentally different from the 2000 election, however, in that in each it was impossible to establish a winner until the election was actually resolved in the electoral college or in the House of Representatives. Thus, the focus on these elections in the legislative history actually proves the opposite of what the Administrator claimed. They demonstrate that even though the 2000 election was a close election in common parlance, the 2000 election was not a "close" election within the understanding of the Act's drafters, the type of election where an apparent winner could not be ascertained. An examination of these "three such close elections" indicates that the 2000 election was close in a layman's sense of the term, but not in the sense in which the Act's authors used the term. Thus, even though the 1960 or 2000 election might be thought of as a "close" election, they were not "close" in the sense used by the Act because there would be no difficulty in ascertaining an apparent winner of the election, even though the identity of the eventual actual winner might remain in question for some time. The three "close" Presidential elections referred to by Fascell, by contrast, are elections where no apparent winner could be identified because no certified electoral college winner could be identified. Of course, there was no Presidential Transition Act during the time of these elections; nonetheless, Fascell's reference to those elections provides guidance as to what types of elections he considered to be "close" elections for purposes of the Act's definition.
In 1800, for instance, there was an electoral college tie between Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr, thus requiring resolution of the election in the House of Representatives. 159 At that time, prior to the enactment the Twelfth Amendment, electors did not vote separately for the President and Vice President, but rather had two votes each, with the candidate receiving the largest number of votes elected President and the second-highest candidate becoming Vice President. To account for this, the Democratic-Republicans should have arranged for one Burr voter to cast his vote for an alternative candidate. 160 Thus, the problem in the election of 1800 was that under the pre-Twelfth Amendment rules there was no way to identify an apparent winner of the 1800 election because neither Jefferson nor Burr could claim a clear victory in the electoral college. As a result, the election was thrown into the House of Representatives, at which point the Federalists almost decided to throw their support to Burr so as to prevent 158 See Light Testimony, supra note 157. 159 See PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 36, at 39-41. 160 Interestingly, the defeated Federalist Party recognized the dilemma, and one elector cast a vote for John Jay, thereby giving John Adams 65 votes and Charles Coatesworth Pinckney 64 votes. Id. at 38-39.
Jefferson from being elected. 161 In the end, Burr refused to promise that he would govern as a Federalist, and thus the Federalist scheme failed and Jefferson was elected. 162 In the 1824 election, four candidates received substantial electoral votes, thereby preventing any of them from receiving an electoral college majority. 163 Each candidate was essentially a sectional candidate. Andrew Jackson received a plurality of electoral votes (as well as the popular votes that were cast), but not a majority, thereby throwing the election into Congress. Under the Constitution, the top three vote-getters in the electoral college, Jackson, John Quincy Adams, and William H. Crawford, could be considered. Henry Clay, who finished fourth in the electoral college, threw his support to Adams, spawning accusations of a "corrupt bargain" between the two men to make Adams President and Clay Secretary of State. 164 Clay's support gave Adams twelve of the twenty-four states necessary to carry the election in the House; eventually New York threw its support to Adams as well. After Adams's victory, Clay was in fact named Secretary of State, infuriating the Jacksonians. Again, no apparent winner could be ascertained in the 1824 election because the indeterminacy of identifying an electoral college winner when no candidate had a certified majority, with the election finally being decided in the House under uncertain conditions.
The election of 1876 raised yet another set of concerns. Contested against the backdrop of Reconstruction, that election contest between Rutherford B. Hayes and Samuel Tilden was riddled with chaos and confusion making it difficult to determine who were the proper electors from the state of Florida. The day after the election, Hayes held a one-vote lead over Tilden in the Electoral College. Tilden, in fact, prevailed in the popular vote by about onequarter of a million votes. Four states submitted double sets of electors making it impossible to even figure out who were the certified electors. 165 South Carolina and Florida each certified two sets of electors, one for each candidate. Louisiana, which at the time had two governors and two canvassing boards, certified two sets of electors as well. In Oregon, one of the victorious Republican electors was a postmaster and thus was ineligible under the U.S. Constitution. As a result, the Governor certified the top-polling Democratic elector to replace him. The ineligible Republican resigned as postmaster and was then again elected as an elector. Oregon thus also sent two slates of electors to Washington. Until the legitimate electors from each of these states could be identified, it would have been impossible to name either of the candidates as the apparent winner because they held the balance in the electoral college. Moreover, the House was under Democratic control and the Senate was controlled by Republicans. The issue was not resolved until a special commission was formed to study and resolve the issue. 166 Even then, Tilden backers threatened to filibuster the final count until Hayes agreed to withdraw northern troops from the South, thereby effectively ending Reconstruction. The final result of the election was not announced until 4:00 a.m. on March 2, 1877 and Hayes was inaugurated three days later. Clearly the uncertainty associated with that election fought out in the shadow of Reconstruction is distinguishable from the controversy of the 2000 election.
As these brief summaries indicate, although the 2000 election was "close" in a conventional understanding of the term, it was not "close" in the same way as the three elections alluded to by Fascell as situations where it would be difficult to ascertain an apparent winner for purposes of the Act. The 2000 election, by contrast, was comparable to the "close" election of 1960, where the vote was close and multiple challenges to the election raised doubts about whether the certified electoral victory for Kennedy would hold in the end. Thus, even though Fascell expressed concern about the effect of "close" elections on the implementation of the Act, the legislative and historical context indicates that Fascell did not consider the 1960 election to be a close election for purposes of the Act because an "apparent winner" was readily ascertainable. Moreover, Paul Light observes that Fascell probably did not include on this list of close elections the election of 1888 in which Grover Cleveland won the popular vote but lost to Benjamin Harrison in the electoral college, even though this would clearly be thought to be "close" in a conventional usage of the term. 167 Comparing the facts of these "three such close elections" of 1800, 1824, and 1888, and contrasting them with the election of 1960, an election "as close as anyone could want," reveals the distinctions from the 2000 election and strongly indicates that the Administrator's definition of a "close election" deviates from that of the Act's sponsors.
The reference to these "three close elections" also illuminates the remainder of Fascell's observation that if "the administrator had any question in his mind, he simply would not make any designation." Again, it is clear that Fascell is referring to the ability to ascertain whether a 166 It is likely that Tilden would have succeeded in prevailing in the commission, exc ept that the tie-breaking voter, Supreme Court Judge David Davis, was disqualified from the commission the day before he was appointed because he was elected to the United States Senate by the Illinois state legislature. This allowed for the appointment of a Republican-leaning Justice instead, who cast all tie-breaking votes in Hayes's favor. Id. at 55-56. 167 candidate has a certified electoral college majority. If the administrator is unable to make that assessment-such as in the elections of 1800, 1824, or 1876-then he should refrain from doing so "until a decision has been made in the electoral college or in the Congress." Thus, this out-of-context statement from the legislative history fails to support the Administrator's interpretation of the Act. The Administrator's interpretation of these excerpts from the Act's legislative history was thus incorrect. He relied on isolated bits of legislative statements uprooted from both their legislative and historical context. When read in context they simply do not support his position. Rather, they reinforce the interpretation advocated here, namely that the Act required the Administrator to recognize Bush as the president-elect.
V. Functional Analysis
An analysis of the Act's policies functional analysis confirms the conclusions of this essay. First, the purpose of the Act is to provide for an orderly and speedy transition of power from one administration to the next. Second, the Act designates such transition activities to be of a governmental function, and thus provides resources so that the expenses are borne by the public, rather than by private individuals. Reviewing each of these policies in turn indicates that the transition resources should have been released immediately to the Bush-Cheney transition team and that the Administrator abused his power by refusing to do so at that time.
A. Promoting an Orderly and Speedy Transition
The primary purpose of the Act is "to promote the orderly transfer of the executive power in connection with the expiration of the term of office of a President and the inauguration of a new President." 168 The Act arose from a bipartisan study conducted during the Kennedy administration, which recognized the importance of an orderly transition period that would ensure that the new administration could "hit the ground running" and be ready to govern from the first day in office. 169 The Act states:
The national interest requires that such transitions in the office of President be accomplished so as to assure continuity in the faithful execution of the laws and in the conduct of the affairs of the Federal Government, both domestic and foreign. Any disruption occasioned by the transfer of the executive power could produce results detrimental to the safety and well-being of the United States and its people. Accordingly, it is the intent of the Congress that appropriate actions be authorized and taken to avoid or minimize any disruption.
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Disruption or delay in effectuating a transfer of power to the apparent successful candidates would threaten the national interest. A failure to provide adequate resources to enable a smooth and speedy transition during the short period between the general election and the inauguration substantially handicaps a new President's ability to govern and pursue policy objectives during the first year of his term. As John Sununu, former Chief of Staff to President 168 Presidential Transition Act of 1963, § 2. 169 See SMITH, supra note 4, at CRS-9. 170 Presidential Transition Act § 2. (emphasis added).
Bush, testified to Congress in early December, "A one-month delay now will be reflected in a six-month or one-year delay in getting things really started." 171 Indeed, news reports in November and December of 2000 indicated that this concern helped to produce economic jitters that eventually blossomed into a recession. The failed nomination of Linda Chavez to serve as Secretary of the Department of Labor was also attributed in part to the shortened transition period and the inability to fully investigate her background. Other news stories raised concerns about the effect of the election uncertainty on foreign affairs and military obligations. It is exactly this sort of national harm and loss of public confidence that the Act seeks to avoid through its early identification of a President-elect and its provisions for a smooth transition.
This policy also explains the Act's decision to allow the release of transition resources to the "apparent" successful candidate, rather than awaiting an official announcement of a winner. Congress's fears are a one-way street -the country will undoubtedly be harmed by delay in releasing the transition resources, but there will be minimal harm from releasing the resources to the apparent successful candidate. Money can be replaced; time cannot. Given the brief period of time between the election and the inauguration, every day is crucial. Thus, it is equally crucial that transition resources be made available as soon as an apparent successful candidate is identified. Congress recognized delaying the transition would create irremediable harm to the country. This delay is even more damaging when the apparent successful candidate is from the non-incumbent political party, thereby making it impossible to maintain continuity by retaining the incumbent President's officials and priorities. As the sitting Vice President, Al Gore retained all of the resources of office to effectuate his transition, including offices, a residence, and staff. 172 In addition, the Act appropriates money to outgoing Vice-Presidents.
In contrast to the substantial harm caused by a delay in releasing the funds, releasing the funds prematurely will have little countervailing harm, even if it turns out that the apparent winner is not the actual winner. It will not change the identity of the eventual official winning candidate. From a purely financial perspective, one would expect that many of the expenses associated with setting up a transition office would be incurred regardless of the candidate who prevailed, meaning that many expenses themselves will not be wasted. A prompt release of transition resources to the apparent successful candidates, Bush and Cheney, is the only understanding of the Administrator's duties that is consistent with the policy goals of the Act.
The need for quick action also rebuts the Administrator's belief that he should wait for a concession or resolution of litigation before declaring an apparent winner. First, relying on these factors inherently creates substantial delay and uncertainty, undermining the speediness and effectiveness of the transition. Second, these factors open the door to politically-motivated delay in declaring an apparent winner, as happened during the 2000 election. 173 Finally, because of the vagueness and subjectiveness of these factors and the absence of any effective mechanism for review-i.e., how much certainty is enough?-they are prone to easy manipulation, making it is difficult to constrain the Administrator from making wholly partisan judgments.
It is possible that the candidate initially identified as the apparent winner may later have to yield that designation to a different candidate sometime between election day and the inauguration, but this eventuality would have little negative impact on the policies animating the Act. While some of the money allocated for the transition will have been spent, many of the expenses of the transition will have been incurred regardless of which candidate spent the funds, such as expenses for heat, plumbing, office supplies, support staff, office equipment, moving expenses and the like. The transition period for the new President-elect would have been shortened as well, but this would also be the case if as during the 2000 election, the Administrator refuses to recognize either candidate as the apparent winner. Thus, a reversal in identifying the apparent winner will have little negative effect on the policies of the Act, and certainly far less effect than a decision to delay the decision as occurred in this case.
A problem with the Act is that it makes no express provision for what happens if the Administrator recognizes the apparent winning candidate only to have this candidate later turn out not to be the actual winning candidate. However, the failure to make provision for what happens in this situation does not justify a refusal to follow the requirements of the Act to pay out the money in a timely manner.
B. The Need for Integrity and Public Confidence
The history of the Act indicates a second policy goal that suggests the need for a prompt release of transition resources and thus a swift recognition of an apparent winner. Prior to the Act, transitions were funded by the political parties and by private donors. An express purpose of the Act was to replace that system with a system of government-supported Presidential transitions. Congress clearly understood the transition to a new administration to be of a governmental or quasi-government nature, which should be funded by the federal government, rather than by political parties or private donors. 174 Equally important, the sponsors of the Act believed that private financing of transitions raised the perception of special interest influence over the transition process, providing some interests with undue influence even as the new administration established policies and priorities. As Congressman Rosenthal observed on the floor of the House, "If someone is going to come forward and help pay what we now recognize is a cost of government, which is actually what it is, during the transitional period, that person may feel inclined to think that he is entitled to special consideration from the government."
175 One purpose of the Act was to allay these fears:
173 See supra notes77-86 and accompanying text (describing political pressures placed on the Administrator [W]e should here and now say by the passing of this bill . . . that from now on the government will assume its responsibility and shall pay the cost for the orderly transition of government. If we do this . . . we can prevent any special group or any special interests from anxiously coming forward to help pay government expense. . . .
[I]t is my opinion that this is the most significant reason, and I think a singular and important reason why this bill should be enacted.
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Congressman Fascell expressed these goals even more forcefully:
I think the political climate can be very, very much improved by not having the President-elect and the Vice-President-elect of the United States calling on his friends and others who might be interested to pay the costs of him assuming office in this, the greatest country in the world. It just does not seem proper and necessary to have them going around begging for money to pay for the cost of what ought to be legitimate costs of Government . . . .
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The Act plainly intends to relieve an incoming administration from being saddled with a choice between having to beg for money from private individuals on the one hand and seeing their transition undermined by lack of resources on the other. In fact, news reports at the time indicated that the Bush-Cheney transition team confronted that choice. Unable to gain access to the funds designated by the federal government to effectuate a transition, the Bush-Cheney transition team was forced to turn to private donors for money to fund their transition. It appears that in so doing they complied punctiliously with all ethical and legal rules governing the acceptance of such contributions.
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Despite their efforts to prevent actual conflicts of interest, there are additional problems that are simply inherent in being forced to rely solely on private funding of transitions, and for which such safeguards will be unavailing. The drafters of the Act were concerned about the perception of impropriety occasioned by the reliance on private funds for a transition as well as believing that it is simply improper to require private financing of a public governmental function. These concerns of perception and unfairness are inherent in relying solely on private financing of transitions, which is exactly why the Act provides governmental funding of transition efforts. Thus, again, the policies of the Act compel the conclusion that the funds should have been released to the Bush-Cheney transition team as soon as they became the apparent successful candidates so that they could effectuate their transition appropriately.
C. Summary
It is evident that the policies animating the Act -the need for a smooth and speedy transition untainted by special-interest influence -would be satisfied only by releasing transition resources as soon as a candidate can be identified as having earned a majority of electoral votes. This suggests that if the Administrator has discretion under the Act, the policies of the Act indicate that it is appropriate to err on the side of releasing the funds too early rather than too late.
VI. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
The problems that arose with the Presidential Transition Act during the 2000 election were primarily the result of lawless action by the GSA Administrator in refusing to abide by the plain language and congressional intent of the Act, as well as political pressures imposed by the White House seeking to gain an advantage for Al Gore and to frustrate the Bush-Cheney transition. Regardless of the reasons for his lawless and obstinate behavior, by refusing to abide by the law the Administrator substantially prejudiced the Bush transition efforts, forcing them to rely exclusively on private fund-raising for several weeks and substantially reducing the time they had to coordinate their transition efforts. In light of the costs that this one mid-level bureaucrat was able to impose on the country during the 2000 election, it is appropriate to consider whether Congress should amend the Act.
In considering amendments to the Act, it should be recognized that the problems that happened during the 2000 election resulted not from any defects in the Act itself, but resulted from the lawless and irresponsible behavior of the GSA Administrator in refusing to carry out the Act's mandate. The Act is plain on its face and context eliminates any possible ambiguity. Once Bush claimed a certified majority of electoral votes he should have been declared the president-elect and been tendered the transition resources. Given the implausibility of a Gore victory at that point, on the facts of the situation there was no reasonable basis for withholding the transition resources from Bush. Unfortunately, the act provides no mechanism for an aggrieved party to force the Administrator to carry out his statutory duties under the Act, and certainly no mechanism that could be effective within the short time limits of the transition period.
To prevent this opportunism in the future, the Act could be amended to define the term "apparent winner" to make explicit what is already implicit in the Act, namely that the apparent winner should be declared as soon as one candidate has a majority of certified and pledged electors. It is not clear that this would be an improvement over the current law (correctly implemented, of course). Substituting this language might imply that this is the exclusive way of ascertaining the apparent winner. One could imagine scenarios where the apparent winner could be easily ascertained, even if he lacks an electoral college majority. Nonetheless, the Administrator's lawless actions in the 2000 election are likely to be cited by future Administrators confronted with similar situations. Thus, the need to re-clarify the statute may be sufficiently pressing to necessitate explicit language regarding the legal relevance of an electoral college majority.
The Act should also be amended to provide for the situation where the apparent winner does not turn out to be the actual winner in the end. Election contests rarely overturn the initial, certified winner. Nonetheless if this were to happen in a particular presidential election, additional money should be appropriated to the final apparent winner if the identity of the apparent winner changes before the election results are final.
Where the outcome is sufficiently in doubt, Congress could also provide that, transition funds could be released to both candidates pending final resolution of the outcome of the case. This option is not available under current law because the Act permits payment to only one candidate (the apparent winner) and gives the Administrator no discretion to release funds to a candidate who is not the apparent winner, even though that candidate might later turn out to be the actual winner of the election.
If Congress wants to amend the statute to make the determination of an apparent winner more of a matter of discretion of a government official, then the Administrator of the GSA is not the appropriate party to make this determination. At the very least the power to ascertain an apparent winner should be vested in a more senior official, preferably one with some degree of expertise to make such a determination, such as the Attorney General. Under current law, the utter absurdity of vesting this power in an official of such minor standing and so unsuited to make the determination that indicates that Congress did not intend for it to be anything other than a routine decision governed by a bright-line rule. If Congress intends for the decision to be more difficult or discretionary than current law implies, then it should vest the power in a more suitable official.
Although an improvement over the current regime, the Attorney General is still a political appointee, thus this solution would not wholly eliminate the political influences that noticeably influenced the Administrator's decision. Thus, if Congress pursues this course, it may be more appropriate to create an independent commission to make the determination of when an apparent winner can be identified. 179 This might insulate such a commission from some more blatant forms of partisan influence, but would still be inferior to a bright-line statutory command that removed the possibility of politically-motivated decision-making.
Because any of these solutions would leave the potential for arbitrary or politicallymotivated action, Congress should also allow for the expedited appeal to federal court of any decision made under the Act by a party who unsuccessfully requests a release of the transition resources. Alternatively, Congress could limit the trigger for review to a request by a party who has attained a majority of certified and pledged presidential electors. Limiting the opportunity for review to this more narrow class of cases would head-off premature or strategic requests for access to the transition resources while maintaining the Act's current focus on the accomplishment of an electoral college majority as the crucial basis for determining the apparent winner.
Regardless of what Congress chooses to do, it is crucial that it do something to prevent a disastrous recurrence of the 2000 election where one minor ministerial officer of the executive branch claimed the authority to withhold the transition resources for well over a month, thereby slicing the President-elect's transition time in half. Not only did this power grab lack any legal basis, but it was exercised in an arbitrary and politically-motivated way. In so doing, it prejudiced the presidential transition and created the exact the problems that the Act was intended to alleviate, such as delaying the transition and forcing a reliance solely on private fundraising. Congress must do something to ensure that such a situation never materializes again.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Presidential election of 2000 raised a number of unprecedented legal issues. Many of those issues were evanescent and are unlikely to arise in the future, even in an election as close and contentious as this one. The problem of the interpretation and administration of the Presidential Transition Act, however, is almost certain to a rise again. The ability of the incumbent administration to manipulate the Act for political purpose and to thereby undermine the transition efforts of a rival party is certain to tempt future administrations. The Act originally intended that the determination of a President-elect be a relatively simply matter, one to be ascertained solely by examining whether one candidate had earned an electoral college majority. As the sponsor of the Act observed, the 1960 election-one at least as close, contentious, and uncertain as the 2000 election-presented no problems in ascertaining an apparent winner. Nonetheless, the Administrator of GSA, inspired in large part by political pressures emanating from the White House refused to recognize an apparent winner until after the Supreme Court ruled in favor of George Bush and Al Gore conceded the election. In so doing, the Administrator violated the Act's language and intent and undermined its policies as well, harming the Bush transition and the country as a whole in the process.
Although the Administrator's actions clearly violated the Act, the Bush-Cheney transition team had little recourse to rectify the violation. My hope is that this article will provide an authoritative interpretation of the Act, its history, and policies, and useful suggestions for reform to avoid similar problems in the future.
